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Abstract
Denial-of-Services (DoS) attacks are nowadays one of the main problems for small and
large companies as they entail a high recovery cost in relation to the frequency that they
are suffered. Depending on the intensity of the attack launched, these can be defined as
high-rate attacks, which seek for a huge shipment of packets in a short space of time,
and low-rate attacks, which seek for a continuous delivery of lower proportion of packets
for longer time. Being able to detect the latter type is much more complicated due to its
similarity with legitimate traffic and, therefore, easily avoids state-of-the-art detection
and mitigation measures. The real-time detection of these attacks is certainly a challenge
for computer security. This work focuses on presenting some existing detection methods
for DoS low-rate attacks as well as analyzing their effectiveness in a simulated traffic
environment.
Keywords: network security, Denial-of-Services, attack detection, low-rate, infor-
mation theory, entropy, Shannon, expectation of packet size, network traffic analysis,
traffic simulation
Resumen
Los ataques de denegación de servicios (DoS por sus siglas en inglés) son hoy en día uno
de los principales problemas para las pequeñas y grandes empresas, ya que implican un
alto coste de recuperación en relación a la frecuencia con que se sufren. La detección
en tiempo real de estos ataques es ciertamente un desafío para la seguridad informática.
Dependiendo de la intensidad del ataque lanzado, éstos pueden definirse como ataques
high-rate, que buscan un gran envío de paquetes en un corto espacio de tiempo, y ataques
low-rate, que buscan una entrega continua de menor proporción de paquetes por más
tiempo. Ser capaz de detectar ataques low-rate es mucho más complicado debido a
su similitud con el tráfico legítimo y, por lo tanto, estos ataques eluden fácilmente las
medidas de detección y mitigación actuales. Este trabajo se centra en presentar algunos
de los métodos de detección existentes para ataques DoS low-rate, así como en analizar
y comparar su efectividad en un entorno de tráfico simulado.
Palabras clave: seguridad de redes, denegación de servicios, detección de ataques,
low-rate, teoría de la información, entropía, Shannon, tamaño de paquete esperado, análi-
sis del tráfico de redes, simulación de tráfico
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Summarising in one line, Denial-of-Services (DoS) attacks attempt to disable access to
resources at the targeted victim that is connected to a computer network. An attack
detection system is responsible for identifying an ongoing intrusion whereas a response
mechanism attempts to ease the damage that has been caused by localizing the attackers
and reducing the intensity of the incursion [1]. In the last few years, with the network
migrating to cloud computing environments, the rate of DoS attacks has grown substan-
tially [2].
The difficulty that underlies when defending a system against this type of attacks
is due to the fact that said attacks do not target specific vulnerabilities of the victim
machine, but the only fact that the target is connected to the network instead. Nowadays
there is even a school of thought that considers DoS attacks perfectly legal since they
can serve as a means to protest within the Internet. One way or another, preventing
and mitigating such attacks has become an issue of critical importance as there is almost
nothing the victim can do to be protected from a DoS-type attack.
Based on the rate of packets per second of a DoS intrusion, they can be classified
in high-rate and low-rate attacks. High-rate ones were popular in the 90’s, but their
efficiency is null nowadays because of the improvements that Internet security has ex-
perienced ever since. However, low-rate ones are much more complicated to detect due
to their similarity with legitimate traffic and, therefore, they easily avoid current detec-
tion and mitigation measures which results in a very negative impact for the victim due
to the waste of energy and resources that they experience in their systems and, conse-
quently, the increase in their maintenance cost. The real-time detection of these attacks
is certainly a challenge for computer security.
For the aim of our work, we will evaluate and compare existing detection methods
for low-rate attacks, contrasting the metrics employed in each one as well as their effec-
tiveness based on the percentage of successful detections tested on large networks traffic
captures. Moreover, these methods will be implemented using a network simulator to
verify whether the effectiveness of the method is maintained for smaller home networks.
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Introducción
Resumiendo en una línea, los ataques de denegación de servicios (DoS) intentan desha-
bilitar el acceso a los recursos de la víctima atacada que se encuentra conectada a la
red. Un sistema de detección de ataques se encarga de identificar una intrusión en curso,
mientras que un mecanismo de respuesta intenta aliviar los daños causados por la local-
ización de los atacantes y reducir la intensidad de la incursión [?]. En los últimos años,
con la migración de las redes a entornos de cloud computing, la tasa de ataques DoS ha
crecido sustancialmente [2].
La dificultad que subyace a la hora de defender un sistema contra este tipo de ataques
se debe a que dichos ataques no se dirigen a vulnerabilidades específicas del equipo
víctima, sino al hecho de que el objetivo se encuentra conectado a la red. Hoy en día existe
incluso una escuela de pensamiento que considera que los ataques DoS son perfectamente
legales ya que pueden servir como medio de protesta dentro de Internet. De una forma u
otra, prevenir y mitigar tales ataques se ha convertido en un tema de vital importancia,
ya que no hay casi nada que la víctima pueda hacer para protegerse de un ataque de tipo
DoS.
Basándonos en la tasa de paquetes por segundo de una intrusión DoS, se pueden
clasificar en ataques high-rate y low-rate. Los ataques high-rate eran populares en los
años 90, pero su eficiencia resulta nula hoy en día debido a las mejoras que la seguridad en
Internet ha experimentado desde entonces. Sin embargo, los ataques low-rate son mucho
más complicados de detectar por su similitud con el tráfico legítimo y, por lo tanto, eluden
fácilmente las medidas actuales de detección y mitigación, lo que resulta en un impacto
muy negativo para la víctima debido al gasto de energía y recursos que experimenta en
sus sistemas y, en consecuencia, al aumento del coste de mantenimiento. La detección
en tiempo real de estos ataques es sin duda un reto para la seguridad informática.
Para ello, evaluaremos y compararemos algunos de los métodos de detección para
ataques low-rate existentes, contrastando las métricas empleadas en cada uno de ellos,
así como su efectividad en función del porcentaje de detecciones exitosas probadas en
capturas de tráfico de grandes redes. Además, estos métodos se implementarán utilizando
un simulador de red para verificar si la eficacia de dichos métodos se mantiene en redes
domésticas de menor tamaño.
2
Chapter 2
State of the art
2.1 DDoS attacks
Traditionally, DoS attackers target a server, which is providing a service to its consumers.
Behaving like a legitimate customer, DoS attackers try to flood it in a manner such
that the service becomes unavailable due to a large number of pending requests and
overflowing the service queue [3]. A different flavour of DoS is Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS), where attackers are a group of machines targeting a particular service.
There is a high rise in the number of reported incidents of DDoS, which makes it one of
the most important threats amongst many [4].
A DDoS attack can be defined as a cooperative, multi-source and large-scale attempt
to prevent the legitimate access and use of network resources or services, typically by
draining connectivity, processing capacity and/or memory of the targeted machine or
network. That is, a lot of malicious hosts coordinate to flood the victim with an abun-
dance of attack packets, so that the attack takes place simultaneously from multiple
points [5]. We know from classical textbooks that security falls into three categories:
confidentiality, availability and integrity. It is obvious that DDoS attacks belong to the
availability category [6].
This kind of attacks are typically launched from a large number of previously compro-
mised hosts to attain the goal of the attack, due to the fact that they require a significant
amount of bandwidth to be successful. An example diagram of how a DoS attack works
is shown in Figure 2.1. DoS attacks can be generated in application, transport, network
and physical layers of TCP/IP framework using different protocols, such as ICMP, TCP,
UDP or HTTP [7].
There are different ways to perpetrate a DoS attack in order to achieve the disruption
of active services. Their two major goals are to consume bandwidth and to overwork the
server.
One typical approach consists in sending a stream of packets from the attacker to the
victim. This stream consumes some key resources, which makes the service unavailable for
3
Figure 2.1: Typical DoS attack diagram.
the victim’s legitimate clients. Another approach consists in sending some few malformed
packets that confuse an application or protocol stack on the victim machine and causes
the system to freeze or reboot.
However, why are so many attacks still occurring today and it has not yet been able
to stop, or at least mitigate, these attacks?
We have to take into account that the Internet is the largest man-made system
in human history. The cyberspace is huge and complex, and it stays in an anarchy
status. Moreover, it is impossible to force a security policy to all parties of the Internet,
and without collaboration among different ISPs, it is certainly hard to implement said
security policy. More importantly, there are even ISPs who support malicious activities
for financial or political purposes.
The other main reason for the continuity of attacks to this day is related to the ease of
obtaining hacking tools and software in the cyberspace. As a result, an attacker may not
need profound knowledge of networking or operating systems to initiate a cyber attack.
2.1.1 How DoS attacks are launched
In general, DDoS attacks can be launched in two forms. The first one aims at crashing
a system by sending one or more carefully crafted packets, which are designed based on
some vulnerabilities of the victim.
The second form of DoS is to use a large amount of traffic to exhaust the resources of a
victim, such as network bandwidth, computing power, operating system data structures,
4
Figure 2.2: Typical flowchart of a DoS attack.
and so on. As a result, the quality of service of the victim is significantly degraded or
disabled to its legitimate clients. Compared with the first form, the second form of DoS
attack is harder to deal with.
In order to launch an effective DoS attack, cyber attackers have to firstly establish a
network of computers known as a botnet. In pursuance to organize it, attackers deeply
scan the members of the botnet in order to find vulnerabilities in the potential hosts
that may end up shaping the botnet to gain access to them by deeply scanning them.
The next step for the attacker is to install malicious code and malware programs on the
compromised hosts. The hosts running this infected code are known as bots or zombies.
The headquarter of a botnet is known as Command and Control (C&C) server [6]. This
server is necessary to exist as it will have to communicate with its bots for updating the
malware programs previously installed on them or issuing an attack order and, perhaps,
receiving status information from said bots.
2.2 History of DoS attacks
The earliest uses of DDoS attacks, often mounted using botnets of infected machines,
were for extortion and criminal activities. Online gambling industries were the ones who
most suffered these threats, since their services were often disrupted at an important
time such as on the eve of a major sporting event [8].
It has already been more than 25 years since the first DoS attack took place. Since
that first considered as a DoS involuntary attack, performed in 1988 and known as the
“Morris worm”1, a lot of variants have been emerging over the years, although they all
share a common result: the disruption of the availability of the target machine or network
and its services. It was not until 1996 when an effective DoS attack arose with the goal
of said disruption of the system, known as the “Panix attack” [9].
In the late 1990s, the so-called Smurf attack method, an early form of amplification
attack, spread quickly and became well known. In a Smurf attack, an ICMP Echo
Request packet is sent. The attackers spoof the source address of these packets to be the
1The name comes from its creator Robert Tappan Morris, a graduate student at Cornell University.
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ultimate attack victim’s IP address, and send the traffic to the broadcast address of a
network. All of the hosts on the network will do their best to reply to the traffic –sending
an ICMP Echo Reply packet in response to every Echo Request packet received–, but
in fact they send it to the victim. In this way, a single attacker can noticeably multiply
their traffic [9].
DDoS attacks have shown a wide range of different motivations and reasons to be
performed over the years, which started as acts of heroism to end up evolving into a
mechanism to compete in an invisible war with political and economic purposes. We
can see that cyberspace has become a haven for intelligent criminals, who are motivated
by significant financial or political reward. All these social reasons have led to use DoS
attacks as a tool for profit making, using them to paralyze a competitor’s web or to
degrade connectivity of users to market rival services, as examples.
In business terms and according to the cyber crime report the Ponemon Institute
publishes annually [10], larger organizations experience a higher proportion of costs re-
lating to denial-of-services, malicious insiders and malicious code. DoS attacks have, on
average, the second most expensive cybercrime cost weighted by attack frequency, right
after malicious insiders whose impact is a 25% greater than the DoS one. Moreover, the
cost of these cybercrime activities as a whole affects different industry sectors in a very
variable scale as seen in Figure 2.3.
From among the many attackers who target the Internet infrastructure, such as the
root DNS servers, about two per year are able to build a botnet large enough to cause
a noticeable impact. A small subset of DoS attacks is financially motivated. In these,
attackers threaten or demonstrate that they can disrupt an e-commerce site and demand
a ransom from the victim to prevent further attacks [11]. Another subset of DDoS attacks
appear to be politically motivated. These attacks gained wide public attention and they
are now closely associated with hacktivism and other political uses.
2.3 Current classification of DoS attacks
Due to the wide variety of cyber-attacks taking place on the Internet today, and their
constant evolution towards new scenarios, it is difficult to classify DoS attacks univocally
and universally. However, a series of classifications developed by organizations dedicated
exclusively to the field of cybersecurity have already been established and can serve as
a basis and reference for later developing a classification based on our approach to the
work we want to develop.
Among these organizations, we will use the classifications proposed by ENISA and
INCIBE. The latter, in particular, highlights two classifications of DoS attacks according
to the damage it causes to the victim and the level of the OSI layer that is exploited.
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Figure 2.3: Chart of average annual cost of cyberattacks by industry sectors in 2017 and
2018 according to the Ponemon Institute anual report [10].
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2.3.1 Based on the kind of damage produced
1. Saturation: the main objective of this type of attack is to overload or saturate
certain system resources that are key to its proper functioning. These resources
may include bandwidth, processor usage, memory consumption, available access to
external resources, storage disk space or system power. This attack strategy has
been mainly used in recent years by the hacktivist group Anonymous, carrying out
a series of attacks that relied on a wide network of attackers.
2. Modification of configurations: The main objective of this type of attack is to
alter or eliminate the configuration parameters of certain resources that are key to
the proper performance of affected systems, being these mainly servers or routers.
3. Destruction: The main objective of this type of attack is the modification or
destruction of physical components of the affected system. Although initially, in
order to carry out this type of attack strategy it was necessary to have physical
access to the facilities where the victim systems were hosted, the fact that certain
industrial control systems are currently connected to the Internet has made it easier
for attackers to carry out this type of attacks remotely.
4. Disruption: The main objective of this type of attack consists in the sudden inter-
ruption of communications between two or more devices through an alteration of
the state of the information that is in transit, so that the transfer of such informa-
tion is unfeasible. A clear example of this attack strategy would be the illegitimate
restart of active Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) sessions.
5. Obstruction: The main objective of this type of attack is to obstruct commu-
nications between two or more interlocutors, thus preventing both parties from
successfully and fully contacting each other. A clear example of this type of attack
could be the selective filtering of IP addresses by ISPs based on their reputation
level.
2.3.2 Based on the level of OSI layer targeted
1. Infrastructure level: In this group we are going to include all the different types
of attacks that focus on exploiting vulnerabilities of the systems at network and
transport layer level following the OSI layer model. The network protocols that are
most often under attack are TCP, UCP and IMCP, as they are the most commonly
used protocols for the exchange of information on the Internet.
However, there are other protocols in these layers that, although they are not
used directly as a basis for communication on the Internet, have vulnerabilities
that may be critical due to the environment in which they are used, such as the
DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol version 3), widely implemented in industrial
environments.
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Figure 2.4 shows a classification developed by the North American DDoS protection
company, RioRey, which presents a taxonomy of the different types of attacks that
can be depicted according to the type of protocol under attack.
2. Application level: This group includes all those attacks directed against the last
layer of the OSI model, which seek to exploit vulnerabilities inherent to the im-
plemented applications that result in an unavailability of the service for legitimate
users. DDoS attacks targeting the HTTP protocol are very common, although
effective attacks against SMTP and DNS protocols have also been developed.
2.4 Detection of DoS attacks
To defend against DoS attacks, several countermeasures have already been developed.
Anyhow, all of them usually consist of three ordered steps: detection, mitigation and IP
trace-back.
In pursuance of achieving attack detection, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
must be developed. It is defined as some sort of software or hardware used to detect
unauthorized traffic or activities that are against the allowed policy of a given network
[12]. A simple classification of IDSs is shown in Figure 2.5. They can be classified based
on the audit source location as either host-based, network-based or a combination
of both. IDSs can also be categorized based on the detection method employed as
one of two types: signature-based or anomaly-based detection [13]. The first one works
based on an already existing database with known attack signatures that match certain
patterns or strings with a pattern of incoming packets that have been analyzed. The
second one consists in an anomaly-based detection method which compares the previous
network behavior profile prepared from normal traffic and based on a stored historical
with the incoming network behavior at real-time [14,15].
Moreover, when talking specifically about network-based IDSs, we can also differenti-
ate between various systems of detection depending on the analysis of the network
traffic we perform – statistics-based, knowledge-based or machine learning-based. In
addition, depending on the granularity of analysis in the network, we can distin-
guish among packet-level and flow-level analysis. We will focus in this second type in
our work.
Chapter 4 explains two specific methods for low-rate detection that have also been
tested for high-rate detection. These attacks fall into the category of anomaly-based
methods, as they compare the properties of the traffic under study with the properties of
traffic previously characterized as legitimate. In this sense, information theory-based
metrics and expectation of packet size are defined. Both methods calculate, from
mathematical models, a series of traffic properties that have resulted to effectively detect
changes in network behavior for which traditional detection methods have not proven to
be practical. Both methods will be explained in detail further on.
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Figure 2.4: DDoS taxonomy proposed by RioRey company.
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Figure 2.5: Proposed IDS classification.
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It is clear that, for detecting low-rate attacks based on the capacity of each net-
work and the behavior of its traffic considered as legitimate, the network-based, machine
learning-based approach should be the one adopted. For this purpose, it is interesting to
differentiate between an attack and an anomaly. An attack can be defined as a sequence
of operations that puts the security of a system at risk, whereas an anomaly is just an
event that is suspicious from the the point of view of the security [16].
In a paper published by a group of researchers from the University of Granada [16],
anomaly-based intrusion detection systems are described to operate in three phases:
1. Parameterization: the parameters of the system are defined
2. Training: the model of the normal behavior of the traffic is built
3. Detection: the traffic behavior is compared against that of the training phase. If
the comparison exceeds a threshold value, a detection alarm is triggered.
Although the characterization of legitimate traffic that occurs during the parametriza-
tion and training phases seems to be static and performed only once at the start of the
detection procedure, these two steps can be dynamically calculated as the traffic during
peak hours is significantly more dense than at dawn.
The majority of current DoS detection methods belong to the signature-based ones
and therefore they are incapable of detecting not well-known or new attacks. The reason
is that these methods are based on specific attack features. Thus, innovative anomaly-
based approaches have been recently proposed to analyze different parameters of attack
flows. In order to help detecting these not-known attacks, we will compare existing
detection methods based on information theory metrics and expectation of flows packet
size. Moreover, we will implement a small network topology to perform low-rate attacks
and compare the effectiveness of said detection methods.
Depending on the approach used to monitor and observe network traffic, the analysis
of said network can focus whether in individual packets of information or flows of those
packets. The latter approach is said to be way more scalable than traditional packet-based
traffic analysis. As flow monitoring grasps the complete chain of packet observation, data
classification and data analysis, we will classify traffic within flows instead of as individual
packets in order to better detect mistrustful network behaviour.
For a deeper understanding of the comprehensive comparison of existing low-rate
attack detection methods that will be developed in Chapter 4, it is relevant to know
other especially network-based detection methods that have proven not to be as effective
for the concrete detection of low-rate attacks. Amongst these methods, we will define
activity profiling, sequential change-point detection and wavelet analysis.
Activity profiling consists in calculating the average packet rate for a specific net-
work flow. Consecutive packets with similar header fields such as both source and desti-
nation addresses, ports and protocol represent a network flow. The average packet rate
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can be determined by the time elapsed between two consecutive matching packets. The
average packet rates of all incoming and outgoing flows are used to calculate the total
network activity by dividing the sum over the average packet rates. Moreover, individual
flows with similar characteristics can be grouped in a cluster. The average packet rate of
the clusters will be used to detect the attack based on an increase in the average packet
rate within the clusters.
On the other hand, sequential change-point detection is based on detecting a
change in statistical models as soon as possible after the occurrence of said change,
thereby reducing the probability of triggering a false alarm. More specifically, the prob-
lem of detecting an attack can be formulated and solved as a change-point detection
problem by detecting a change in the distribution or model with a minimal average delay
controlling, at the same time, the rate of false detections [17]. This detection method
filters the traffic at the victim, according to source and destination addresses, ports and
protocol. The filtered traffic is treated as a time series. This type of algorithms is applied
to DoS attacks by comparing the actual average for the traffic in the time series with the
expected average from a time series sample computed in advanced.
Finally, wavelet2 analysis works with spectral components in wavelets as input sig-
nal. This method counts with an inherent time-frequency property that allows splitting
signals into different components at several frequencies. Wavelet transform can be used
to analyze and characterize flow-based traffic behaviors by splitting signals into different
components at three ranges of frequencies, for example. Thereby, low frequency compo-
nents may correspond to patterns over a long period; mid frequency components capture
daily variations in the flow data, and high frequency components analyze short term vari-
ations. Wavelets provide time and frequency characterization for a signal, as opposite to
traditional Fourier analysis, which only provides a frequency characterization [18]. The
time-localized anomalous signals can be separated from the noise signals by wavelets and
by analyzing each spectral window’s energy, the anomalies can be determined. The main
advantage of wavelet analysis is that it is able to capture complex temporal correlation
across multiple time scales with very low computational complexity [19]. However, this
method has its own limitations since low frequency scans have resulted not to be accurate
enough as anomalous patterns are not correctly detected.
These traditional methods have a number of limitations when it comes to carrying out
effective detection of DoS attacks. Amongst said limitations, the main one is undoubtedly
the difficulty of detecting anomalous behaviour based on long-term observation, even if
comparing current traffic with an historic of the traffic observed in advance. Thereby,
the use of customized low-rate attack detection methods is more interesting as they have
combined the advantages of each of these traditional methods with the inherent feature
of long-term of the low-rate attacks.
2A wavelet is a mathematical function used in digital signal processing and image compression and
its principles are very similar to those on Fourier analysis. Wavelets make it possible to recover weak
signals from noise.
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Chapter 3
Low-rate DoS attacks
3.1 Definition of low-rate DoS attacks
Low-rate attacks are defined as those denial of service attacks that, having as their main
objective to affect the availability and performance of the targeted system, present a
traffic distribution and a packet sending rate similar to legitimate traffic, so that the
difficulty of effective detection is increased in contrast to traditional DoS attacks, known
as high-rate.
Traditional detection methods, previously explained, focus on a detection strategy
based on the comparison of incoming traffic against a known pattern, specifically mon-
itoring parameters such as the number of packets per second sent or the number of
simultaneous requests made from an attacking machine.
Low-rate attack traffic cannot be analyzed by following a known pattern of behavior
that could trigger the alarm, as they are indistinguishable from legitimate traffic. There-
fore, these methods are not effective and new techniques based on different approaches
have been developed in recent years.
3.2 Proposed classification for DoS attacks
Based on the classification framework proposed by Mirkovic and Reiher [20], the most
interesting categories have been selected in this work in order to encompass and better
explain existing low-rate detection methods later explained, depicted in Figure 3.1.
3.2.1 By source address validity
Making a differentiation based on the validity of the source address may seem unnecessary
at first for what concerns the detection of a DoS attack. However, it is of great interest
for a later implementation of the mitigation system, since spoofed addresses can be more
difficult to block without negatively affecting access to the service to legitimate users.
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Figure 3.1: Proposed DoS attacks classifying framework based on Mirkovic and Reiher’s
taxonomy.
Thus, using spoofed source addresses is highly desirable for the attacker in order to
avoid accountability. A clean example of this is the Smurf attack, previously explained.
Moreover, this kind of attack may spoof source addresses by using a reserved set of them
or part of an assigned but not used address space of the targeted network. Nevertheless,
current routers and firewalls rules can easily detect these spoofed addresses by comparing
if incoming packets have been actually sent from an internal address and if not, they are
discarded. Anyhow, it is not a necessary condition to perform a DDoS attack since those
forwarding to invalidate certain applications or protocol features must use valid source
addresses [20]. In this way, spoofing is certainly more preferable for attackers although
a DoS attack can also be effectively performed with valid source addresses.
3.2.2 By victim type
As attacks do not necessarily need to target a single host machine, a differentiation
between the type of targeted victim is assuredly required. As indicated in Figure 3.1,
this criteria yields four types of attacks: Application, Host, Network and Infrastructure-
based attacks.
Application attacks exploit some elements of a specific application on the victim
host hence disabling legitimate clients from using said application and probably clogging
resources of the attacked host machine. In order to avoid them, each application would
have to be securely modeled and its performance monitored to account for possible attacks
[20].
Next, the so-called host attacks seek to completely disable the victim machine through
an overload or through undermining its communication mechanism with the network.
The high packet volume required to accomplish that purpose facilitates their detection.
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Network attacks consist in consuming the incoming bandwidth of the target network
with packets whose destination address belongs to the target network’s address space.
This kind of attack can also be easily detected due to their high volume of packets.
Finally, infrastructure attacks focus on bringing down a crucial distributed service
for the Internet network –such as power plants or DNS server farms– independently if it
is globally or locally located. The main feature of these attacks is not the mechanism de-
ployed to disable the target infrastructure, but the simultaneity of the attack on multiple
instances of said critical services in the Internet as a whole.
3.2.3 By impact on the victim
Possibly the most interesting differentiation in this classifying framework is to focus
on the impact on the victim; hence the disruptive and degrading attacks. Although
disruptive attacks are the kind most currently known attacks belong to, degrading ones
are considerably more interesting. Whereas the former ones focus on completely denying
the victim’s service to its clients, the purpose of the latter is to consume part of the
victim’s resources. As this variety of attacks does not result in total service disruption,
they could remain undetected for a significant amount of time, thereby causing a huge
damage on the victim in business terms.
For large companies that offer their services in the network such as Google or Netflix,
both types of attacks are equally dangerous as they prevent the correct use of the only
service for which their customers pay, which is to have it available on the Internet.
A disruptive attack can be very expensive in temporary terms immediately after suf-
fering the DoS attack since it can take several hours to restart the fallen servers. However,
companies suffer much more the effects of degrading attacks in the long term, because by
not detecting them so easily and not throwing the network down completely, but simply
hindering and reducing the quality of service, users may end up being unsubscribed from
service after a while for not meeting the quality expectations they had about said service.
Not all DoS attacks involve flooding the network, such as the classic volumetric dis-
ruptive attack. Other forms focus on the application layer by making a lot of requests for
large files or by imposingly slowing down connections at the application level. Therefore,
due to a considerable number of poorly configured servers on the Internet, disruptive
attacks using reflection methods1 are the prevalent ones nowadays and lean to be the
methods favored for massive-scale attacks that exploit poorly configured servers.
1In a DoS reflection attack, an attacker spoofs his or her IP address with the victim’s one and sends
request messages for information to servers or hosts on the network that are well-known for responding
to such type of messages. From the servers’ perspective, it was the victim who sent the original request.
All the data from those servers gathers, congesting the target’s Internet connectivity if the attacker has
much higher bandwidth than the victim since the victim machine gets lots of unsolicited responses that
consume all its network bandwidth.
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3.2.4 By intensity of the attack
In an initial approach of the classification of Mirkovic and Heiser (Figure 3.1), we consid-
ered, from the definition of degrading attack, that the concept of low-rate attack could
be adjusted to this same definition. However, after analyzing the aspects that were taken
into account when categorizing an attack as disruptive or degrading, we realized that the
impact that a DoS attack may have on the victim depends more on the victim’s ability
to respond to. In contrast, classification in low-rate or high-rate exclusively depends on
the ratio of packets per second that are sent. It may be the case of launching a high-
rate attack without necessarily crashing the targeted service because it has a powerful
mitigation system and in the same way, a low-rate attack may be able to knock down a
smaller service such as a home network.
In this way, we can define high-rate attacks as those that involve a large volume of
traffic and that are normally designed to stop a service completely – although, as we
have explained before, the success of this action depends on the mitigation measures of
the attacked machine. They are relatively easy to detect as their traffic profile deviates
significantly from the normal traffic profile of the network [21]. On the other hand, low-
rate attacks are much more difficult to detect since they are intended to significantly
affect the connectivity to the network or service attacked through a constant sending
of packets that are coated among legitimate traffic and they can easily evade the tra-
ditional anomaly-based detection systems [21]. Specifically, maliciously chosen low-rate
DoS traffic patterns that exploit TCP’s retransmission time-out mechanism can strangle
TCP flows to a small fraction of their ideal rate while eluding detection [22].
3.3 Detailed low-rate attacks classification
One of the biggest problems facing IT security professionals is reaching a consensus on
a universal taxonomy on which to base the classification of cyberattacks. However, such
taxonomies can be based on parameters that are completely independent of each other
–such as the nature of the attack, the type of fundamental feature of computer security
that it affects, or the way in which it is carried out and propagated. For this reason,
a similar phenomenon occurs when it comes to classifying low-rate attacks in a more
exhaustive way. Therefore, in this work we will proceed to explain the two classifications
that are considered most relevant to understand the functioning of low-rate DoS attacks
in a holistically way.
3.3.1 Low-rate DoS based on traffic flow parameters
Zhang et al. proposed in [23] a simple and precise classification that is briefly presented in
this section. As previously mentioned, the goal of this work is to compare and determine
the most effective detection method for low-rate DDoS attacks. In order to achieve it, we
will filter network traffic by flows. A flow is defined in [24] as a set of IP packets passing
an observation point in the network during a certain time interval, which share a set of
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properties. These common properties may include packet header fields, such as source
and destination IP addresses and port numbers, packet contents and meta-information.
Moreover, flow records are defined as information about a specific flow that was
observed at an observation point, which may include both intrinsic properties of a flow
–IP addresses and port numbers– and measured properties –packet and byte counters.
They can be imagined as rows in a typical database, with one column per property [25].
For the purpose of this work, we will take into consideration that a flow is determined
by a 5-tuple as stated by Zhang et al. [23]. Any combination of source address, source
port, destination address, destination port and protocol can be used to group traffic
packets in flows. We will only choose source IP address for the experimental tests of
information theory-based detection methods specifically for sake of simplicity. We will
define each flow with Fi.
A distributed low-rate attack consists of multiple attack flows F1, F2, ..., Fn which
come from different machines over the Internet. Four parameters are needed to describe
a low-rate DoS attack flow:
1. Ta: attack period
2. Tb: attack burst width
3. Rb: attack burst rate
4. s: starting time of the attack flow
As we have defined the concept of flow, we can describe a distributed low-rate attack
by using four parameters:
1. n: total number of flows in the attack
2. g: number of attack flow groups
3. m: number of members in an attack flow group
4. σ: constant starting gap between consecutive flow groups
Therefore, low-rate attacks can be classified in four categories as shown in Figure 3.2
depending on how Ta, Tb and Rb are being distributed amongst multiple flows:
1. Attack Frequency Intensification (AFI): the aggregate attack period (Ta)
is equally distributed amongst n flows. This way, the attack frequency of the
aggregate flow is intensified by n times, in comparison to the frequency of each
attack flow (Figure 3.2.a).
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Figure 3.2: Low-rate DDoS attack classification by Zhang et al. (a) Attack Frequency
Intensification (AFI), (b) Attack burst Width Intensification (AWI), (c) Attack burst
Rate Intensification (ARI), and (d) Mixed Intensification (MI). The unit for Rate is
Bytes/s and the unit for Time is second.
2. Attack burst Width Intensification (AWI): the burst width of the aggregate
flow is equally distributed amongst n flows. In other words, an attack burst of
a flow is immediately followed by a burst from another flow. That is, the attack
burst width of the aggregate attack flow is intensified by n times (Figure 3.2.b).
3. Attack burst Rate Intensification (ARI): n flows start at the same time, and
the burst rate of the aggregate attack flow is intensified by n times (Figure 3.2.c).
4. Mixed Intensification (MI): any combination of the previous three (Figure
3.2.d).
We consider this classification to be certainly interesting since it differentiates between
period, width and rate –common features in all kinds of signals– and help us to better
understand the nature and behavior of low-rate attacks compared to high-rate ones.
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3.3.2 Low-rate DoS based on techniques used to negatively impact the
availability of the victim
During the exhaustive research process carried out for the development of this work,
one of the main problems we encountered was the diversity of network implementation
proposals for the deployment of a low-rate attack based on the mechanism for sending
attack packets and therefore, the choice of a single type of implementation of attack
submission rate approach that could meet the requirements of all detection methods to
be compared.
Focusing on the exploitation of the intrinsic vulnerability of the control mechanisms
that manage the TCP congestion and taking as a reference the different patterns of
sending malicious packets adopted in various articles relating to the object of study, a
clear division can be established between pulsing attacks and constant attacks for
carrying out DoS attacks, both high-rate and low-rate.
Pulsing attacks are characterized by periodically sending burst attack packets over
short periods of time repeatedly whereas constant attacks are performed by sending
constant traffic but with a rate of packets per second that would not be identifiable at a
glance if we divided the different existing flows in a network and superimposed them in
a visual representation.
In pulsing attacks, burst periods are normally used by attackers to explore the
homogeneity of the minimum retransmission timeout (RTO) while performing pulsing
attacks. As described in Kuzmanovic’s research, for an effective execution of these type
of attacks, periodic on-off “square-wave” shrew attacks are defined, consisting of short,
maliciously-chosen-duration bursts that repeat with a fixed, slow-time scale frequency
[22].
The square-wave stream pattern can be observed in Figure 3.3. The effectiveness
of this type of attack resides only in the attacker being able to retransmit the packets
periodically following this on-off pattern, so that it collides with the legitimate packets
at the moment of reaching the attacked victim. According to the implementation of the
TCP protocol, if a legitimate user’s packet cannot be delivered correctly, and is therefore
considered a packet loss, the TCP flow will enter a timeout hold and attempt to send a
new packet RTO seconds later. This mechanism is used as an attempt to avoid congestion
collapse. In case of additional loss, the RTO doubles with each subsequent waiting time.
Therefore, it is obvious to consider pulsing attacks very difficult to be successfully
executed, especially when the victim is configured within a network with a wide band-
width and thousands of simultaneous connections per second –such as a video-on-demand
server– since the real impact that this attack would have on such a network would be so
low that it could even be irrelevant to detect and mitigate.
Moreover, existing signature-based metrics for detecting pulsing attacks are based on
finding an underlying pattern in the analyzed traffic, namely the burst –or pulse– period,
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Figure 3.3: Underlying square-wave DoS stream on pulsing low-rate attacks as presented
by Kuzmanovic in [22].
which is usually set to 1 second. However, the ineffectiveness of this method has recently
been demonstrated in [26], as this metric does not take into account certain parameters of
the network environment under study, such as traffic congestion while a low-rate attack
is occurring. It is therefore necessary to develop anomaly-based detection methods for
an effective detection of pulsing attacks.
On the other hand, the successful execution of constant attacks, based mainly
on a constant sending of slow traffic at a rate that is very difficult to distinguish from
the legitimate traffic rate, is achieved as long as the greater number of simultaneous
connections towards the victim are kept open for as long as possible.
If we continue to consider the TCP protocol for carrying out low-rate attacks, there
is a more particular denomination of constant attacks known as "low and slow attacks".
These focus on the application layer and specifically, on the HTTP and TCP protocols
for sending malicious packets. They usually target web servers, with the aim of tying up
every thread with slow requests, thereby preventing legitimate users from accessing the
service. This is accomplished by transmitting data very slowly, but just fast enough to
prevent the server from timing out.
Within this category, the most widespread attack is known as Slowloris. Developed
by Robert "RSnake" Hansen in 2009, his algorithm of attack allows a single machine to
take down another machine’s web server with minimal bandwidth by keeping many con-
nections with the target web server open and holding them open for as long as possible.
This way, affected servers will keep these connections open —receiving partial HTTP
headers and waiting to receive the rest of the headers— filling their maximum concur-
rent connection pool, eventually denying additional connection attempts from clients as
Slowloris sockets are tying up the thread.
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Chapter 4
Comparative analysis of existing
detection methods for low-rate
attacks
Nowadays, there are plenty of proposals for DDoS attack detection methods, mainly
high-rate attacks, but there are an increasing number of methods being developed for
the specific detection of low-rate ones, due to the similar characteristics that low-rate
traffic shares with legitimate traffic.
For the present work, two main methods have been selected, both based on metrics
that can be implemented for experimental tests. In addition, as both employ a tolerance
factor and the standard deviation of the sample as a function of the proposed metrics,
performing an analysis of both has been considered to be quite representative for purposes
of comparing results.
4.1 Detection based on information theory metrics
Low-rate attacks are far way more difficult to detect than disruptive ones as they submit
attack packets periodically. To defy that hindrance, we introduce entropy as the basis of
information theory metrics to accurately detect them.
The concept of information theory refers to the field of study of communication,
quantification and storage of information. A key metric in information theory is entropy,
which can be defined as the amount of uncertainty associated to a random variable or
more accurately, as the amount of information gained by the observations of disordered
systems. Other information theory metrics are mutual information, channel capacity,
error exponents and relative entropy —most commonly known as Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence. Since the calculation of information distance metrics requires that the two
compared sets have the same number of elements —i.e., the same number of captured
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network flows— for the present work we will mainly focus on entropy metrics for sim-
plicity when generating traffic for experimental tests.
Back in 2011, Shannon’s entropy and Kullback–Leibler’s divergence metrics were
assumed to be the most effective methods in detecting irregular traffic based on IP address
or packet size distribution statistics [27]. However, the constant evolution of Internet
traffic and the increasing amount of data transmitted over the network every second has
made it necessary to investigate more effective methods to suit the varying characteristics
of traffic. This is why two recently developed entropy metrics are presented along with
Shannon’s entropy, which the former ones have proven to be quite more effective on both
real and malicious network traffic captured in 2007 than the latter one.
In information theory, entropies make up of the basis for distance measures among
various probability densities. The development of the idea of entropy of random vari-
ables by Claude Shannon provided the fundamentals of information theory. Entropy and
related information measures provide useful descriptions of the long-term behavior of
random processes [28].
Comparing the rate of entropy of some sample of traffic flows to that of another
sample of traffic flows provides a mechanism for detecting changes in the randomness.
The entropy shows its minimum value 0 when all the items –source IP address for the
present case study– are the same and its maximum value log(n) when all the items are
different. We will use the variation of entropy on compared traffic distributions based on
source IP for DDoS detection. As we are mainly interested in measuring the entropy of
flows over unique source IP addresses, then the maximum value that n can reach will be
232 for IPv4 addresses.
The Shannon entropy equation provides a way to estimate the average minimum
number of bits needed to encode a string of symbols, based on the frequency of the
symbols. The entropy is higher as the information variable is more random. As a
consequence, the greater certainty of the information variable is, the smaller the entropy
is. Specifically, the generalized information entropy metric is very relevant in statistics
as an index of diversity.
The Shannon entropy H is given by the formula 4.1, where pi1 is the probability
of character number i appearing in the stream of characters of the message and b is the
number of different signal levels that a character can adopt. As we are working with bits,
the value of b will be 2 as bits can adopt either 0 or 1 values.
H(x) = −
∑
i
pi · logb(pi) (4.1)
1 The pi here denotes probability density for an ith character. As probability density values lay in the
range from 0 to 1, it means that logarithm functions will take on negative values. Since we talk about
entropy, which cannot decrease in isolated systems (according to Second Law of Thermodynamics), it is
mathematically more correct to put a “−” before the sum so that the value in the sum becomes positive.
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More recent researches [15] have developed a novel metric that occurs to be more
effective on the calculation of entropy of a system based on Shannon’s entropy. One of
them is the so-called generalized entropy metric given by Formula 4.2, which is a
generalization of the Shannon’s one, where pi is the probability of the event xi, with
xi ∈ {x1, x2, ..., xn} for pi ≥ 0. Adopted to our case, these events will be the different
source IP addresses and pi will be the density of traffic from said source address. This is
a very interesting metric to use as we can obtain much better detection results by using
generalized information entropy and adjusting the value of its integer order σ as we will
demonstrate in Chapter 5.
Hσ(x) =
1
1− σ log2
(
n∑
i=1
pσi
)
(4.2)
Proof. For order σ = 1, the generalized entropy metric converges to the Shannon’s one.
lim
σ→1
log2
(
n∑
i=1
pσi
)
1− σ
As lim
σ→1
log2
(
n∑
i=1
pσi
)
= lim
σ→1
log2(1) = 0, and lim
σ→1
1−σ = 0, we obtain an indetermination
as
0
0
. Therefore, we can apply L’Hôpital rule which states that the limit of the division of
two functions will be same for the division of the derivates of the functions: lim
x→1
f(x)
g(x)
=
lim
x→1
f(x)′
g(x)′
. Moreover, log(f(x))′ =
f(x)′
f(x)
. The limit, after having derived both parts of
the fraction, would remain:
lim
σ→1
∂
∂σ log2
(
n∑
i=1
pσi
)
−1 = limσ→1−
∂
∂σ
∑n
i=1 p
σ
i∑n
i=1 p
σ
i
We can derive pσi as
∂
∂σp
σ
i = log(pi) · pσi . The limit will be then:
lim
σ→1
−
∑n
i=1 p
σ
i · log(pi)∑n
i=1 p
σ
i
= −
n∑
i=1
pi · log(pi)
which corresponds to the Shannon’s entropy formula.
In the work published by Behal and Kumar in 2017 [21], reference is made to an
improved entropy metric first enunciated in [29], known as φ-entropy and defined ac-
cording to formula 4.3. This novel measure of information theory proves to be much
more accurate in detecting low-rate attacks with precision.
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Hσ
′(x) = − 1
sinh(σ)
(
n∑
i=1
(pi · sinh(σ · log2(pi))
)
(4.3)
Proof. For order σ = 0, the φ-entropy metric converges to the Shannon’s one.
lim
σ→0
− 1
sinh(σ)
(
n∑
i=1
(pi · sinh(σ · log2(pi))
)
As sinh(σ) = 0, multiplying every other element in the numerator, and sinh(σ) = 0,
we obtain an indetermination as
0
0
. Therefore, we can apply L’Hôpital rule which states
that the limit of the division of two functions will be same for the division of the derivates
of the functions: lim
x→1
f(x)
g(x)
= lim
x→1
f(x)′
g(x)′
. Since (f(x) · g(x))′ = f(x)′ · g(x) + f(x) · g(x)′
and sinh(f(x))′ = cosh(f(x)) · f(x)′, the limit, after having derived both parts of the
fraction, would remain:
lim
σ→0
−
∑n
i=1 pi · cosh(σ · log(pi)) · log(pi)
cosh(σ)
= −
n∑
i=1
pi · log(pi)
which corresponds to the Shannon’s entropy formula.
Very different network traffic scenarios can provide the same entropy value, as this is
absolute regardless of the characteristics of the context in which it is calculated. There-
fore, we will need to know the normalized standard deviation of the network under study
from a series of legitimate traffic samples. A considerable difference from the standard
deviation of the traffic analyzed at a given time with respect to the value for the traffic
modeled as legitimate will allows us to classify this certain traffic as malicious.
For the entropy-based detection algorithm, the s standard deviation of entropy in
legitimate traffic is defined as shown in Formula 4.4:
sN =
√∑n
i=1(HN −Hi)2
n
(4.4)
being HN the arithmetic mean of entropy calculated from n samples of legitimate traffic
captured and Hi the entropy calculated from each one of said samples.
Based on the specific features of each network on which the detection method is
deployed, a tolerance factor α must be tuned, which will allow the model to be stressed
as much as possible so that detection would be as effective as possible, obtaining the
lowest value rate of false positives.
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With this tolerance factor, we define the distance gap DH(α,∆t) in Formula 4.5 as
the difference between the entropy of the analysed traffic and the average entropy of
the legitimate traffic adjusted according to the tolerance factor α ∈ R and the standard
deviation sN for legitimate traffic, for a sample in period t.
DH(α,∆t) = |HC −HN | − α · sN (4.5)
Therefore, the detection system set in Formula 4.6 will produce an affirmative detec-
tion of malicious traffic when the value of this distance gap is greater than or equal to
zero, and would consider the traffic as legitimate for a value less than 0:
IH =
{
1, DH(α,∆t) ≥ 0
0, DH(α,∆t) < 0
(4.6)
4.2 Detection based on Expectation of Packet Size (EPS)
In October, 2017, a group of researchers from the Wuhan Polytechnic University, in
China, proposed a new detection method based on a fundamental parameter of network
traffic flows, the packet size [30]. Thus, instead of determining the existence of an un-
derlying attack on the network from the entropy calculation –which has been proven to
be quite limited as the difference between the entropy of legitimate traffic and malicious
traffic is so small that it can lead to a high percentage of false positives– these researchers
propose a method based on the expectation of packet size.
As explained earlier, DoS attack detection methods have traditionally been classified
into two major categories: signature-based and anomaly-based methods (Figure 2.5).
The former have quickly become obsolete as they analyze traffic distribution against a
limited set of patterns, which does not lead to effective detection for low-rate attacks
since attack traffic behavior at the network level is very similar to that of legitimate
traffic.
If we analyze the characteristics of legitimate traffic, we observe that the size of
packets varies depending on the protocol and the type of user information. However,
legitimate traffic, which includes communication-protocol packets and user-data packets,
follows a predictable packet size in normal situations.
Most communication-protocol packets have a predefined packet size in order to in-
crease the effectiveness and facilitate detecting them by the hosts of a network. In
addition, said packet size is usually small.
On the other hand, the size of user-data packets is usually larger, and can easily reach
the Maximum Transmision Unit (MTU). The MTU is the maximum packet size that the
data-link layer can transmit and is usually set to 1500 bytes in Ethernet v2 protocol.
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However, when a low-rate DDoS attack is occurring, the packet size of a single le-
gitimate packet, regardless of whether the communication-protocol packet or user-data
packet is included, is very difficult to detect as stealthy [30], as each packet is a legit-
imate packet but the aggregation of them exhibits abnormal statistical deviations [31]
and results in a low-rate DDoS attack.
As with the information theory-based detection method explained above, we are going
to classify traffic into flows according to the same parameters –source IP, destination IP,
source and destination ports, protocol used, number of packets sent and total bytes sent.
In paper [30], xi is taken at the ith flow for the selected analysis time range, ci is
taken as the number of packets sent for the flow xi, and lik the size of packet k of flow i,
which would imply the need to operate with an array where each row represents a flow
and each column represents each of the packets received for each flow.
From these parameters, the mean of the packet size for the flow i, can be named li
which follows the Formula 4.7:
li =
1
ci
ci∑
k=1
lik (4.7)
Taking as a reference the number of packets in each flow, we can say that the prob-
ability of a flow xi is defined in Formula 4.8 as:
p(xi) =
ci∑n
i=1 ci
(4.8)
Therefore, knowing that the sum of all probabilities will be equal to 1 and that the
average packet size per flow is represented in bytes, the expectation of packet size (EPS)
is defined in Formula 4.9 as:
EPS =
n∑
i=1
p(xi) · li (4.9)
However, the value of the mean of packet size l¯i cannot be considered an absolutely
representative value since the repetition of the same value n times has as average the
same as if we take only the same number of values of the extremes. Therefore, we need
to know the mean standard deviation s of the packets as a function of the EPS in order
to determine whether there is a specific number of flows in the traffic that follow a given
behaviour, which would lead into an excessively high value of s that would indicate that
a low-rate attack is taking place. Specifically, the standard deviation measures how far
away each of the values we have calculated the mean with are from said mean. In Formula
4.10 the standard deviation s for a certain traffic sample is defined as a function of the
EPS value:
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s =
√∑n
i=1(EPS − l¯i)2
n
(4.10)
The fact that some artificially generated low-rate traffic has established patterns for
certain traffic parameters that would be random in a real scenario, is what allows us to
distinguish malicious flows from legitimate ones.
Specifically, we can take a series of samples of legitimate traffic and calculate their
EPS and standard deviation, determining those values that should be considered normal.
We can then use these results as a premise to directly detect anomalies in network traffic
if we compare it with EPS and the standard deviation of traffic in real time.
Similarly as explained in the previous section, researchers [30] define D(α,∆t) as
the distance gap between the metrics calculated for legitimate traffic and current traffic,
considered under attack, for sample in period t. Specifically, they define DEPS(α,∆t) as
shown in Formula 4.11:
DEPS(α,∆t) = |EPSN − EPSC | − α · sC (4.11)
where α ∈ R is a tolerance factor determined according to the features of the network
to analyze.
However, due to the features of the programmatically simulated traffic not being
adapted with sufficient certainty to the features of actual traffic, during the experimental
phase (detailed in Chapter 5) it was observed that the behavior of the detection system
does not operate as expected when α > 5. Therefore, for simplicity of the present work,
this parameter has been determined to be α = 1.
Finally, the detection system is activated when it detects that D(α,∆t) ≥ 0, i.e. as
indicated in Formula 4.12:
IEPS =
{
1, DEPS(α,∆t) ≥ 0
0, DEPS(α,∆t) < 0
(4.12)
4.3 Comparative analysis results
In order to verify the effectiveness of their proposed methods, the authors of both methods
[21], [30] tested real data from datasets available for research purposes under request.
Specifically, both use the attack profile of CAIDA datasets that contains approximately
one hour of anonymized traffic traces from DDoS attacks that took place on August 4
and 22, 2007, for entropy method and EPS method respectively [32], [33].
On the other hand, for the profiling of legitimate traffic parameters, the EPS-based
detection method makes use of real anonymized data gathered from a Fast Ethernet link
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Figure 4.1: Both legitimate and attack traffic scenarios used for testing of the information
theory-based detection method by Behal and Kumar in [21]. Constant and pulsing
attacks were already explained in Section 3.3.2.
that connects the Widely Integrated Distributed Environment (WIDE) backbone network
in Tokyo [34]. Information theory-based metrics (Shannon’s entropy, generalized entropy
and φ-entropy) use MIT Lincoln dataset [35], a custom designed DDoS testbed, FIFA
1998 World Cup dataset [36] and underlying legitimate traffic from CAIDA dataset [33].
All these datasets were used for testing the three aforementioned information theory-
based metrics.
It can be observed that the pulsing traffic used by both authors for the experimen-
tation follows the typical features of high-rate attacks, reaching a packet size rate much
higher than the average rate of legitimate traffic. However, Chapter 5 implements a low-
rate attack traffic scenario with a more normalized packet size using the ns-3 network
simulator.
Among all the DDoS attack detection methods that have been discussed to date, the
two presented methods in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 have been expressly chosen as both use
an α tolerance factor to calibrate the detection algorithms. The research carried out on
this factor has led us to understand the importance of performing a very precise tuning
process to reduce the rate of false positives as much as possible without affecting the
functionality of the detection algorithm.
In Figure 4.1, we can observe the traffic scenario used for testing the novel infor-
mation theory-based metrics developed by Behal and Kumar in [21]. Since the traffic
profiles of the two studies are very similar, we can accurately compare the effectiveness
of each one of them and determine experimentally which detection results to be more
accurate. Additionally, in Figure 4.2, we can observe the traffic scenario used for testing
the effectiveness of the EPS detection method presented by Zhou et al. [30]. All pre-
sented datasets contain traffic data extracted from 2007, so it is clear that the behaviour
of the Internet traffic has evolved since then and the effectiveness of the studied detection
methods should be measured on more up-to-date traffic captures.
As mentioned above, constant attacks generate ilegitimate traffic at a constant low-
rate, whereas pulsing attacks periodically send bursts of packets to victims. Either
29
Figure 4.2: Both legitimate and attack traffic scenarios used for testing of the EPS
detection method by Zhou et al. in [30]. Constant and pulsing attacks were already
explained in Section 3.3.2.
approach usually employs a fixed and small packet size, more closely resembling the size
of communication-protocol packets than user-data packets. Therefore, the probability of
receiving small packets of a given size is much greater for attack traffic than for legitimate
traffic. The latter are distributed following a Poisson-Pareto process.
When developing a comparative matrix that analyzes the effectiveness of different
detection methods, four essential quadrants must be considered:
• True Positive (TP): rate of attack flows that are effectively reported as being at-
tacks.
• True Negative (TN): rate of not attack flows that are effectively considered legiti-
mate.
• False Positive (FP): rate of not attack flows that are mistakenly reported as being
attacks.
• False Negative (FN): rate of attack flows that are mistakenly considered legitimate.
In this way, any detection method aims at increasing the value of TP and reducing to
the maximum the value of FP, although it also may affect the performance of the network
since the 100% of the malicious flows are not detected, as shown in Figure 4.3. In the case
of φ-entropy, it is observed that a null positive phasing rate is obtained from the tolerance
factor α = 2, although the effective detection rate only reaches 75% of the cases, which
means that 25% of the malicious flows are not correctly detected as such. If we take
into account that of the information theory metrics presented, this was the one that has
been shown to be the most effective, it is trivial to consider that Shannon’s entropy and
generalized entropy will achieve even lower detection rates. This is of critical importance
because classifying legitimate flows as attackers may have a much greater impact for the
organization, since this implies that the connection of legitimate users to the service is
blocked, causing a deterioration in the Quality of Service (QoS) provided.
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Two of the most important factors that have to be taken into consideration in network
design are service and cost. Service is essential for maintaining customer satisfaction.
Cost is always a factor in maintaining profitability [37]. Therefore, making an effort
towards granting a quality service is crucial.
In this sense, the term Quality of Service, in the field of networking, refers to control
procedures that can provide a guaranteed level of performance to data flows in accordance
to requests from an application/user using the network [37]. Our study is deeply related
with QoS as we focus on the idea that, in business terms, degrading attacks are far
way more dangerous to certain companies than disruptive ones. For example, banks or
social network platforms would suffer more impact if facing a disruptive DDoS attack as
transactions or immediate communications could not be carried out, resulting in the loss
of millions of euros for the former and on the switch to another platform for daily use
for the latter.
However, companies that offer entertainment services such as Netflix or Spotify will be
considerably more beaten by a degrading DDoS attack, since a service whose performance
has been considerably degraded from the expected may result in a customer dropping
out said service.
The main reason for employing the standard deviation in function of the EPS as part
of the detection equation (Formula 4.11) relies on the fact that, although it has been
determined that the EPS of legitimate traffic is usually greater than the EPS of low-rate
attack traffic, said EPS in a network may dynamically vary and the false negative rate
may increase due to the stochastic nature of network traffic [30]. The standard deviation
is used for measuring the degree of deviation of the attack traffic packet size from its
expectation. Thus, it is trivial that the standard deviation of attack traffic flows will be
small, as these packets are generated following a pattern to hide among legitimate traffic
flows but establishing a fixed packet size that standard deviation can help us detect.
On the other hand, the entropy-based detection system makes use of standard de-
viation s based on legitimate traffic. There is a reason why the two methods differ in
the detection equations D(α,∆t). While the entropy-based method calculates the stan-
dard deviation s of the traffic considered legitimate, the EPS-based method calculates the
standard deviation s of the traffic under study –the one presumably under attack. This is
because the value for HN < HC whereas EPSC < EPSN . This way, we need to contrast
the gap between the values for attack and legitimate traffic with the smaller standard
deviation in order to successfully detect a change in the behaviour of the network under
study.
Therefore, it is certain that, for anomaly detection and regardless of the detection
method used, the distance gap between the attack packets and the legitimate ones should
be as high as possible to increase the detection sensitivity. However, the fact that this
space is too large can lead to a high number of false positive detection since an appro-
priate tolerance factor has not been selected for the network under study. On account
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Figure 4.3: Performance comparative table showing the experimental results carried out
by the authors of the two detection methods under study.
of the nature of Internet being schotastic, this tuning process for the tolerance factor
must be firstly performed on all networks in which the detection method would be imple-
mented, since the network features can vary greatly from one to another and therefore,
the profiling of what is considered legitimate traffic.
For both detection methods, Figure 4.3 shows, for values of the incremental tolerance
factor, the percentage of the successful detection rate, i.e., the total number of malicious
flows detected as such, and the false positive rate, i.e., those legitimate flows that the
algorithm classified as malicious.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the low-rate attack detection method based on
expectation of packet size is far more effective, both in detecting almost all malicious
attack flows and in reducing the number of legitimate flows considered as attackers. On
Chapter 5, we will test the performance of both anomaly-based methods on network-
based traffic and host-based traffic in order to determine the effectiveness of each one
depending on the source (Figure 2.5) under study.
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Chapter 5
Experimental results
We now proceed to study the efficiency of the metrics explained on the previous chapter
–the three aforementioned entropy metrics and the EPS one. For this purpose, an ex-
perimental study has been carried out on a network scenario where low-rate traffic was
simulated. For the set experimental scenario, we will apply both detection methods and
assess their effectiveness. On the assumption that network traffic has the implicit feature
of self-similarity, the results we obtain on a small network should be as correct as those
calculated on datasets of much larger networks.
5.1 Experimental setup
5.1.1 Network architecture
For the implementation and demonstration of the comparative analysis carried out on
the different methods of detection of low-rate attacks, the initial idea was to simulate
a whole network with legitimate nodes, attacking nodes and the affected server, whose
availability would be affected by malicious packets from the attacking nodes.
However, when testing the detection methods implemented on the traffic generated
with the simulator, the results were quite different from the expected behavior. This was
mainly due to the stable behavior of the simulated traffic, which follows an established
pattern and it is practically impossible to simulate programmatically a random behavior
similar to the behavior of real traffic. To overcome this limitation, only attack traffic
was simulated, which as previously explained, could be expected to have a behavior
determined by the properties of low-rate traffic, and then it was merged with actual
traffic captured from a particular network.
Out of the two existing methods for carrying out DDoS attacks that are object of
study (and explained in previous chapters), the method of pulsing attacks was firstly
chosen due to the ease of implementation. In this approach, the attacking nodes followed
the pattern of sending, from set time to time, packets that interfered with the legitimate
traffic, so that the legitimate nodes could not effectively connect to the server.
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Figure 5.1: Packet size and number of packets rates for single attacker traffic and four
attackers aggregate traffic generated.
Nevertheless, by working on a nanosecond scale to make the impact of low-rate attacks
tangible on a small network without these becoming high-rate attacks, it was observed
that simulated malicious traffic rather followed the pattern of a constant attack. Figure
5.1 shows the packet size rate and total number of packets as a function of time for
ns-31 simulated attack traffic. On the one hand, it can be observed that the packet size
remains constant, regardless of the number of attackers generating malicious traffic at a
time. On the other hand, the number of packets sent to the network increases with the
addition of new attackers, following a pattern of constant attack.
The implementation proposed by Samvid et al. interconnected the different nodes of
the network by following a point-to-point topology, as can be seen in Figure 5.2. This
topology, at the data layer level, makes it possible to physically and directly connect two
1 ns-3 is a network simulator developed on C++ that has been used to generate the attack traffic in
a controlled environment. It will be later explained on this chapter.
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Figure 5.2: Low-rate attacks network topology implementation with ns-3 simulator pro-
posed by Samvid Dharanikota et al. [38]
nodes of a network to each other. In this approach, the low-rate attacks attempt to deny
bandwidth to TCP flows while sending packets at sufficiently low average rate to elude
detection by counter-DoS mechanisms. This architecture consists of a single bottleneck
queue driven by n long-lived TCP flows with heterogeneous RTTs and a single DoS flow.
The DoS flow is a periodic square-wave DoS stream. This way, periodic DoS streams
are not utilizing TCP’s exponential backoff mechanism but rather exploiting repeated
timeouts.
However, for the experimental tests, we found the problem that we could not mix
traffic with different topologies at the data link level, since legitimate traffic captured on
a home network implemented the Ethernet topology and attack traffic simulated by ns-3
implemented the point-to-point topology.
In order to work with normalized traffic captures, since the acquisition sources of the
different types of traffic are carried out at different times and networks, we proceeded to
modify the timestamp of the simulated attack packets so that they coincide with the date
and time when traffic was captured in a real network. We also modified the destination
IP address of the victim so that it is the same for both legitimate and attack traffic.
With the legitimate traffic that we captured in a real network, we proceeded to filter
it in order to keep only the TCP traffic whose origin or destination was the IP address
of the attacked server. Legitimate traffic has been captured from a real home network.
In addition, in order to test the effectiveness of the methods studied according to the
source of the traffic (Figure 2.5), traffic has been captured at the victim host interface
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Figure 5.3: Different entropies and EPS values calculated for 8 different traffic samples
considered legitimate and captured in the victim host.
Figure 5.4: Different entropies and EPS values calculated for 8 different traffic samples
considered legitimate and captured in a home network.
and at the network interface of the home router. The different entropies and EPS values
calculated for 8 different legitimate traffic samples is shown in Figure 5.3 for host-based
capture and Figure 5.4 for network-based samples.
From this legitimate traffic, several PCAP2 files have been generated:
• PCAP for attack-only traffic: it stores all the malicious flows that send constant
data towards the victim host.
• PCAP for legitimate-only attack, captured on host interface: it stores all the TCP
and UDP traffic sent and received only by the victim server.
• PCAP for legitimate-only attack, captured on network interface: it stores all the
TCP and UDP traffic sent and received in the home network where the victim host
is connected. Not all flows captured interact with the affected machine.
2PCAP stands for packet capture and it is an application programming interface for capturing network
traffic. Once the traffic has been captured with a PCAP library (as it could be libpcap, integrated in
Wireshark, whose functionalities we will explain in Section 5.1.2), a file with .pcap extension can be
generated and later analyzed with any network analysis tool.
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Figure 5.5: Low-rate attacks network topology implemented with ns-3 simulator.
• PCAP for legitimate host-captured traffic merged with attack traffic: it stores all
malicious and legitimate flows towards the victim host. The are no other flows
whose source or destination address is not the targeted machine.
• PCAP for legitimate network-captured traffic merged with attack traffic: it stores
all malicious and legitimate traffic sent and received in the home network where the
victim host is connected. Not all flows captured interact with the affected machine.
Specifically, the network topology implemented in ns-3 for the generation of low-rate
attack traffic would remain as shown in Figure 5.5. For testing the performance of both
methods depending on te percentage of attacking users generating malicious activity on
the network.
5.1.2 Technologies and tools employed
ns-3 Network Simulator
The previously described network has been implemented pro-
grammatically using the ns-3 network simulation tool.
ns-3 [39] is a discrete-event open simulation network environment for Internet systems
based on C++ programming language. ns-3 provides models of how packet data networks
work and perform, and provides a simulation engine for users to conduct simulation
experiments.
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One of the main advantages of ns-3 is that users can emit and receive ns-3-generated
packets on real network devices. It can also serve as an interconnection framework to
add link effects between virtual machines. The main interest for using ns-3 simulator on
our work is to study the behavior of a system under a DDoS low-rate attack in a highly
controlled, reproducible environment, which allows us to implement the most convenient
network architecture for testing the different implemented detection methods.
In addition, for the installation of project dependencies during the installation and
implementation of the ns-3 simulator, Bake has been used. It is specifically an integration
tool which is used by software developers to automate the reproducible build of a number
of projects which depend on each other and which might be developed, and hosted by
unrelated parties. It works under Linux operative systems and is implemented in Python.
Wireshark
Wireshark [40] is an open source network traffic and packet analyzer, or "snif-
fer", originally developed for Unix and Unix-like operating systems and re-
leased under the terms of the GNU General Public License. It uses Qt, a
graphical user interface library, and libpcap, a packet capture and filtering
library.
As a network packet analyzer3, Wireshark captures network packets and displays
packet data as detailed as possible. As a data capturing program, this tool understands
and shows the encapsulation of different networking protocols. It can parse and display
the fields, along with their meanings as specified by different networking protocols.
The main purposes of Wireshark tool are troubleshooting network problems, examin-
ing security issues, verifying network applications, debugging protocol implementations
and learning network protocol internals.
Wireshark shares many characteristics with tcpdump. The difference is that it sup-
ports a graphical user interface (GUI) and has information filtering features. In addition,
Wireshark permits the user to see all the traffic being passed over the network by putting
network interface controllers into promiscuous mode (if supported by the network inter-
face controller), so they can see all the traffic visible on that interface including unicast
traffic not sent to that network interface controller’s MAC address.
SiLK
The System for Internet-Level Knowledge, better known as SiLK, is a collection of traffic
analysis tools developed by the CERT Network Situational Awareness Team (CERT
NetSA) to facilitate security analysis of large networks. The SiLK tool suite supports
3A network packet analyzer is a measuring device used to examine what is going on inside a network
cable.
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the efficient collection, storage, and analysis of network flow data, enabling network
security analysts to rapidly query large historical traffic data sets. The vast majority
of the current code-base is implemented in C, Perl, or Python to be run in Linux and
Unix-based systems.
The SiLK Analysis Suite [41] is a collection of command-line tools for processing SiLK
Flow records created by the SiLK Packing System or already captured packet files such
PCAP. These analysis tools read binary files containing SiLK Flow records and partition,
sort, count and summarize these records.
Listed below are the commands used in the implementation of ETL4 code for pro-
cessing and cleaning the data captured with Wireshark:
• rwcount summarizes SiLK flow records across time. It counts the records in the
input stream, and groups their byte and packet totals into time bins. This command
splits each flow record into bins whose size is determined by an optional argument.
• rwp2yaf2silk is a script to convert a .pcap to a single file of SiLK Flow records,
which is a necessary format to be able to apply a wide range of other calculations
using SiLK commands.
• rwcut reads binary SiLK Flow records and outputs the user-selected record fields
in a textual, bar-delimited (|) format.
Python
Python [42] is an open-source, interpreted, high-level and interactive pro-
gramming language first released in 1991. It supports multiple operating
systems and programming paradigms, including object-oriented, imperative,
functional and procedural, and operates under the Python Software Founda-
tion license.
The SciPy library has been used for the implementation in Python. It can be de-
scribed as a Python-based ecosystem of open-source software for mathematics, science,
and engineering. This library has a very complete set of packages for the treatment and
analysis of data. Those packages that have been used in the development of this work
are listed below:
• NumPy: fundamental package for scientific computing with Python. It enables the
use of N-dimensional array objects and linear algebra in an efficient and high level
form.
• Pandas: package that provides high-performance, easy-to-use data structures and,
specially of application for our work, 1-dimensional data series.
4Extract, Transform, Load (ETL) is the general procedure of copying data from one or more sources
into a destination system which represents the data in a different way than the source does.
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• Statsmodels: package that provides classes and functions for the estimation of
many different statistical models, as well as for conducting statistical tests, and
statistical data exploration.
• Matplotlib: plotting package that provides publication-quality 2D plotting and
more simple 3D plotting.
• Scikit-learn: complete package for the application of machine learning in Python,
specially in the areas of data mining and data analysis.
5.1.3 Structure of code implemented
For the simulation of low-rate attack traffic, the code initially developed by Samvid Dha-
ranikota, Sagar Bharadwaj and Adarsh Honawad, who carried out the implementation
proposed by [22] in the ns-3 network simulator, has been adapted. In order to be able
to subsequently mix the actual legitimate traffic captured with this generated traffic, the
code has been adapted to include CSMA nodes that would simulate routers connected
via Ethernet.
Simulated traffic with ns-3 with point-to-point protocol does not share the same
link layer protocol as normal Ethernet and Wifi traffic on any home network. For this
reason, when generating malicious traffic, it has been necessary to modify the network
architecture initially proposed by Samvid et al. to include CSMA nodes that allow
capturing packets in the same link layer protocol to later combine it with legitimate
traffic and generate a PCAP on which to test the effectiveness of the methods studied.
In addition, the attack is initially performed by five attackers simultaneously following
a low-rate Mixed Intensification (MI) pattern explained in Section 3.3.1. In an AFI
approach, that traffic from some attackers is sent to the victim just few instants after
the traffic sent by the first other attackers. As some of them starts the sending at the
same time, the attack also follows an ARI approach, thus becoming a MI attack.
For the calculation of the mathematical formulas applied in the detection algorithms
of both methods, several Python libraries have been used. This programming language
has been chosen due to its high processing capacity.
Finally, for the conversion of captured traffic from PCAP format to CSV format so
that it could be easily interpreted in Python, several SiLK suite commands programmed
directly through a bash script have been used.
5.2 Results for information theory-based metrics
5.2.1 Design of the algorithm
For the implementation of the detection method based on entropy metrics, the same
algorithm shown in Figure 5.6 has been followed for the testing of the different presented
40
entropies. Due to the impossibility of generating attack traffic in real time since it has
been necessary to modify a series of characteristics of the packets after their generation
with the ns-3 simulator –such as the timestamp or the source ports from which the
attacking machines sent the malicious packets–, the experimentation tests have been
carried out on a deferred basis.
5.2.2 Results obtained from experimentation
Figure 5.7 shows the different entropy values obtained for the analyzed traffic samples,
both attack-only traffic, legitimate-only –for both host-based and network-based detec-
tion approaches– and the combination of both. It can be seen that there is a considerable
difference between the entropy value of attack-only traffic versus legitimate-only traffic
and, consequently, the combination of the two leads to an increase in the value of the
total entropy of the network under attack.
For the comparison of the different network scenarios, we have chosen the φ-entropy
for order σ = 0.95 as is the entropy metric that generates the largest distance gap (Figure
5.7).
A sample of legitimate traffic captured at the same moment than the other 8 samples
used to calculated the standard traffic parameters has been merged with attack traffic
generated with ns-3 simulator. In order to determine the necessary minimum percentage
of attackers in the network for the detection method to be effective, six different samples
of traffic have been generated for 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 20 attackers.
For the network-based detection approach, the φ-entropy-based detection method
has demonstrate to be effective when there are at least 22% of malicious users in
the network performing an attack. On the other hand, for the host-based detection
approach, the minimum threshold for detection is reached when at least 65% of the
users are malicious.
5.3 Results for Expectation of Packet Size (EPS)
5.3.1 Design of the algorithm
For the implementation of the detection method based on EPS, the algorithm shown in
Figure 5.8 has been followed. As happened with the information theory-based detection
method, the experimentation tests have been carried out on a deferred basis.
5.3.2 Results obtained from experimentation
Figure 5.9 shows the values obtained for the EPS and the standard deviation of the differ-
ent traffic samples analysed. In contrast to the entropy-based detection method, where
it was necessary to achieve a minimum percentage of malicious users on the network, the
EPS-based method does not.
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Figure 5.6: Proposed detection methodology by Behal and Kumar [21] adapted to our
custom Python implementation.
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Figure 5.7: Comparison of entropy values obtained for attack traffic, legitimate traffic
and merge of both for different values of σ.
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Figure 5.8: Proposed detection methodology by Zhou et al. [30] adapted to our custom
Python implementation.
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of EPS standard deviation values obtained for attack traffic,
legitimate traffic and combination of both.
However, a considerable difference in the effectiveness of the method has been ob-
served depending on whether the captured traffic on the host or the entire network is
analyzed. Specifically, the EPS-based method has proven to be very effective over the
traffic captured on the host, since the average packet size generated by legitimate users
was 1275.77 bytes (Figure 5.3), which is logical since the vast majority of host traffic
is user-data, unlike network capture traffic that contains many more communication-
protocol packets that are considerably smaller in size. In contrast to the size of malicious
packets, which have a fixed size of 540 bytes, the existence of only 3% of malicious users
on the network already triggers the alarm signal.
On the other hand, for traffic captured on the network, the EPS method has not
proved to be effective. This is because the average size of legitimate packets, 797.26
bytes (Figure 5.4), is closer to the size of malicious packets, 540 bytes. Despite following
a clear pattern, attack traffic is not always perfect, as there are packets that are lost
during transmission and therefore the standard deviation calculated on malicious traffic,
which ideally should be 0, is modified. In the hypothetical case that the transmission of
malicious packets was perfect and the standard deviation was 0, the EPS-based method
should be just as effective for network-captured traffic as it has been shown to be for
traffic captured directly on the host.
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Figure 5.10: Comparison of packet size rate in a network-based source scenario for legit-
imate traffic and combination of legitimate and attack.
The relevance of using the standard deviation s to detect a relevant change in the
behaviour of the analysed traffic can be seen in Figure 5.10. Without the existence of a
series of attackers in the network that would produce a constant sending of packets of
exactly the same size, the standard deviation from the size of the packets in that network
is a considerably high value. However, by adding all these malicious users to the traffic,
we observe how the average packet size per second is considerably normalized. In this
way, the packets sent by the attackers produce a change in the behaviour of the traffic
which, although it would not be detectable due to the fact that the size of these packets
is between the thresholds considered for legitimate traffic, the calculation of the standard
deviation allows us to detect it.
Nevertheless, the reason why EPS detection is more effective on traffic directly cap-
tured on the host is because the difference between the average EPS of the traffic under
attack and the legitimate traffic is much smaller than in the capture scenario over the
entire network. If the expected average packet size is very similar between the two types
of traffic, the standard deviation of the one under attack must be very small for detec-
tion to be effective. This is why it has been determined that the effectiveness of the EPS
method should be primarily implemented for detection directly at the victim host.
Finally, Figure 5.11 shows the successful detection ratio for the two methods pre-
sented, based on the number of attackers present, depending on whether the traffic was
captured on the host or on the entire network. The number indicated in each cell rep-
resents the distance gap calculated according to Formulas 4.5 and 4.11 for the method
based on entropy and EPS respectively.
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Figure 5.11: Detection effectiveness matrix for different number of attackers in host-based
and network-based captures for traffic under attack.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and future work
6.1 Conclusions
From the work developed, both from the comparative analysis based on the results pub-
lished by Behal et al. [21] and Zhou et al. [30] and from the experimental analysis carried
out for the present work, the following conclusions have been obtained:
• From the results published by the researchers of both papers, it has been concluded
that the EPS-based has a higher detection rate as well as a lower false positive rate.
• Since the experiments carried out by the authors of both proposed methods were
performed by comparing legitimate traffic and attack traffic exclusively, the full
effectiveness of the methods developed cannot be concluded since it has not been
considered that a real DDoS attack is conducted with a combination of attack
traffic and legitimate traffic.
• The entropy-based detection metric has demonstrated to be effective if at least the
22% of the users are malicious when monitoring network-based traffic. For host-
based traffic monitoring, the minimum percentage of attackers should be 65% in
order to effectively detect the occurrence of a low-rate DoS attack.
• It has been experimentally demonstrated that the method of detection based on
expectation of packet size is more effective when it is carried out by monitoring
traffic directly on the victim host than if all the network traffic where the victim is
located is analysed.
6.2 Future work
In order to generate malicious traffic in a controlled environment that is similar in its
characteristics to real Internet traffic, it would be necessary to develop a network simula-
tor instance –based, for example, on the ns-3 simulator– that would allow this traffic to
be generated as close as possible to the expected behaviour. However, the development
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of this task is beyond the scope of this work, but it is especially relevant to confirm the
effectiveness of the methods analyzed applied to much larger networks.
In addition, traffic could be generated in real time, which would allow a process of
adjustment of the properties of traffic considered legitimate, so that these properties are
adjusted in real time to events that could affect the overall performance of the network
without these being attacks, but simply a massive increase in users connected to the
network under study, which is traditionally known as flash events.
Finally, to increase the speed of detection especially in large networks where the
number of users and sending packets is much higher than in a home network, it would
be very interesting to implement the methods studied in an FPGA board. The initial
intention of this work consisted in the implementation of a DoS attack detection system
in an FPGA. However, during the investigation of the different possible classifications
of DoS attacks and due to the fact that there are already numerous effective detection
methods for those considered high-rate, it was decided to study some existing detection
methods of low-rate attacks for which such an exhaustive development had not been
carried out by the scientific community.
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Conclusiones y trabajo futuro
Conclusiones
A partir del trabajo desarrollado, tanto del análisis comparativo basado en los resultados
publicados por Behal et al. [21] y Zhou et al. [30] como del análisis experimental realizado
para el presente trabajo, se han obtenido las siguientes conclusiones:
• De los resultados publicados por los investigadores de ambos trabajos, se ha con-
cluido que el método basado en EPS tiene una mayor tasa de detección, así como
una menor tasa de falsos positivos.
• Como los experimentos realizados por los autores de ambos métodos propuestos
se realizaron comparando tráfico legítimo y tráfico de ataque exclusivamente, no
se puede concluir la plena eficacia de los métodos desarrollados, ya que no se ha
considerado que un ataque DDoS real se realiza con una combinación de ambos
tipos de tráfico.
• La métrica de detección basada en la entropía ha demostrado ser efectiva si al menos
el 22% de los usuarios son maliciosos mientras se monitoriza el tráfico capturado
en la red. Para la monitorización del tráfico directamente en la máquina víctima,
el porcentaje mínimo de atacantes debería ser del 65% para detectar eficazmente
la ocurrencia de un ataque DoS low-rate.
• Se ha demostrado experimentalmente que el método de detección basado en el
tamaño de paquete esperado es más eficaz cuando se lleva a cabo monitorizando el
tráfico directamente en el host atacado que si se analiza todo el tráfico de la red a
la que se encuentra conectada la víctima.
Trabajo a futuro
Para generar tráfico malicioso en un entorno controlado y de características similares
al tráfico real de Internet, sería necesario desarrollar un simulador de red (basado, por
ejemplo, en el simulador ns-3) que permita generar este tráfico lo más similar posible al
comportamiento esperado. Sin embargo, el desarrollo de esta tarea está fuera del alcance
de este trabajo, pero resulta especialmente relevante para confirmar la efectividad de los
métodos analizados aplicados a redes de mucho mayor tamaño.
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Además, se podría generar tráfico en tiempo real, lo que permitiría un proceso
de ajuste de las propiedades de tráfico consideradas legítimas, de forma que dichas
propiedades se ajusten en tiempo real a eventos que puedan afectar al rendimiento global
de la red sin que éstos sean ataques, sino simplemente un aumento masivo de usuarios
conectados a la red bajo estudio, lo que tradicionalmente se conoce como eventos flash.
Finalmente, para aumentar la velocidad de detección especialmente en redes extensas
donde el número de usuarios y envío de paquetes es mucho mayor que en una red domés-
tica, sería muy interesante implementar los métodos estudiados en una placa FPGA. La
intención inicial de este trabajo consistió en la implementación de un sistema de detección
de ataques DoS en una FPGA. Sin embargo, durante la investigación de las diferentes
clasificaciones posibles de ataques DoS y debido a que ya existen numerosos métodos de
detección eficaces para los considerados ataques high-rate, se decidió estudiar algunos
métodos existentes de detección de ataques low-rate para los que la comunidad científica
no había llevado a cabo un desarrollo tan exhaustivo.
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